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ABSTRACT 
This study examined executive remuneration and firms’ performance in Nigeria. Specifically, 
the study seeks to ascertain the nexus between executive remuneration, firm size and board 
size variables and the performance of quoted companies. The population of the study consists 
of all the quoted firms as at 31st December, 2014. A sample of sixty (60) companies excluding 
non- financial firms was selected for the period 2013 and 2014. Summary statistics such as 
descriptive, correlation and granger causality tests were used. Inferential statistics, using 
panel Generalized Least Square (EGLS) with fixed effect was used for the purpose of 
empirical validations. This was after the application of diagnostic test to enhance the study. 
The study ascertained that executive remuneration has a relationship with firm performance, 
but negatively impacted on it; though was not statistically significant. Firm size was 
ascertained not to have significant positive relationship with firms’ performance; though it 
has a causality relationship with the performance of the firms. Board size was found to 
negatively affect the performance of firms and is statistically not significant. Premised on this, 
the study suggests that executive remuneration of quote firms should be pegged constantly in 
a flexible manner. This will enable shareholders known the causality relationship between 
what is paid to the executive and how that influence performance. 
 
KEYWORDS: Executive remuneration, firms’ financial performance, agency theory, Firm 
Size and Board size.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Executive remuneration has been a subject of much debate in developed countries like 
Switzerland, New Zealand, United Kingdom, U.S. and others (Adeyemi, 1991). Researchers 
have always been concerned about certain factors that influence financial performance of 
firms with a view to knowing how to constantly maximize returns on investments of 
shareholders. There are a lot of factors that interplay to influence the performance of firms. 
Executive remuneration is one of the myriad of factors that can impinge on firms’ 
performance (Ayodele, 2012). Often, investigations are hardly made to unravel how much the 
top executives that directs the affairs of a company should receive by way of remuneration 
and other forms of compensations and incentives. According to Adeyemi (1991), executive 
remuneration is the package which goes with labour services. Hence Adeoti and Isiaka (2006) 
argued that the objective of executive remuneration is to attract; motivate and retain good 
people for attainment of the organizational performance. Executive compensation which is 
interchangeably used with executive pay or remuneration comprises of salary and incentive 
pay. Incentive pay could consists of cash and non- cash packages; and is an aspect in finance 
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and accounting that is yet to gain ascendancy in research especially in developing countries 
like Nigeria. Compensation normally takes the form of basic pay such as salary or non-
financial rewards (Ayodele, 2012).   
 
Since executives play strategic roles in directing the affairs of the company so as to engender 
performance, it is expected they are adequately remunerated, but this should be done with 
caution. It is generally known that the primary goal of a firm is wealth maximization; and if 
this is not taken into cognizance by the executive in companies, then the aim of establishing it 
would be defeated from the onset. Most often executives who perform optimally are on high 
demand. Hence, Fama (1980) posits that high performing managers are always on high 
demand and should be rewarded in the form of higher executive remuneration than their poor 
performing counterparts. It becomes crucial in the light of present day global challenges 
rocking the business world to empirically ascertain how executive compensation influences 
companies’ performances in a country such as Nigeria. The rate of empirical studies on 
executive remuneration has increased astronomically in developed countries while the same 
cannot be said in less developed countries like Nigeria. It is not enough to claim that a 
company is inefficient, illiquid, highly geared, affected by arrays of macro- economic factors, 
poor corporate governance and is poorly performing. There is need through an eagle eye to 
thoroughly find out the proportion of firm’s performance that is consumed by the amount of 
executive remuneration as an expense in a given period. 
 
There is no doubt that a relationship exists between business expenses and performance. For 
instance, an increase in business expenses reduces performance, given that all other factors 
are held constant; and vice versa. Obviously, businesses tend to analyze operation expenses in 
an effort to become more competitive, and executive remuneration is usually part of the 
analysis (Shetty, 2013). Therefore, as the global competition increases and businesses attempt 
to improve their performance, there is an increasing need to relate executive remuneration to 
organizational performance (Nicely, 2009). The question of how much companies should pay 
to senior executives to attract, motivate and retain them to keep the business competitive and 
engender the attainment of the shareholders’ wealth maximization goal has remained a subject 
of debate. As such, executive remuneration in relation to firms’ performance has received 
little attention by academics in developing countries (Hengartnar, 2006). In developing 
countries like Nigeria, executive remuneration policies, practices and basis of determination 
are hardly defined in the general corporate governance code of best practices for companies to 
adhere to. Hence, remuneration committee in quoted companies appears to be easily 
influenced by the board members to determine the level of salary that suits them. Most often 
the interest of the shareholders is not taken as a priority on the corporate board. A lot of 
individuals jostle for board membership possibly for the robust pay packages and the immerse 
power attached to such top executive positions.  
 
Numerous studies such as Hall  and Liebman (1998); Morphy (1999); Makinen (2007); Noor, 
Mohd, Rokiah and Novhani (2014); Ayodele (2012); Kurawa  and Saidu (2014); Olalekan 
and Bodunde (2015) have examined the association that exist between executive remuneration 
and firm performance, but with varying mixed results due to different samples, time periods 
and performance indicators. A study by Aduda (2011) reveals that there exist “varying 
degrees of relationships between remuneration of executives and firm performance”. In 
addition, a positive and significant relationship between executive remuneration and quoted 
firms’ performance was made by Ozken (2007), Kabla (2008) and Fald Al-Helzan (2011).  
More recently, Nyaoga, Tarus and Bagweti (2014) found negative correlation between 
compensation and financial performance. Against this backdrop, this study examines 
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executive remuneration and firms’ financial performance in Nigeria. Subsequently, the second 
section of this paper is concerned with a literature review of the subject matter understudy 
while section three deals with methodology. Section four dwells on empirical analysis while 
section five sets the conclusion as well as recommendations of study. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In order to gain more insight as regard the nexus between executive remuneration and the 
performance of quoted firms, agency theory is brought to bear so as to give a proper 
justification for the anticipated empirical validation in this study. Hitt, Ireland & Hoskisson, 
(2009) argued that “the separation of ownership from management does create conflicts of 
interest between manager and shareholders in firms”. This occurrence tends to always afford 
managers opportunity to display certain behaviours that are often at the detriment of 
shareholders’ interest (Tosi, Werner, Katz & Gomex-Mejia, 2000). The agency theory in this 
regard will portend that executive remuneration is a vital and necessary tool to engender 
performance. Jensen and Murphy (1990) hinted reasons for remuneration to manager is that it 
incentivizes them to select and implement actions that will increase shareholders’ wealth.  It 
therefore connotes in the spirit of corporate transparency and accountability, the goal of 
executive compensation is to influence performance. How true could this be in the context of 
Nigerian quoted firms’ remains an issue worth investigating. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL REVIEW 
 
Ayodele (2012) empirically examined the nexus between executive remuneration structure, and 
firm performance in the Nigerian banking industry. The findings show that executive 
compensation structures do not affect banks’ market values proxy at stock price. Kurawa and 
Saidu (2014) further determined the “impact of executive remuneration on financial 
performance of listed banks in Nigeria; findings from the study reveal a positive but statistically 
significant nexus between executive remuneration and the performance of the banks. Olalekan 
and Bodunde (2015) examined the “effect of executive pay on bank performance in Nigeria 
between 2005 and 2012, using a dynamic generalized method of moment (GMM); the findings 
shows that CEO pay has significant but negative influence on bank performance in Nigeria”. 
Aduda (2011) examines the association between executive remuneration with company 
performance in Kenya. The study findings indicates a negative correlation exists between 
executive remuneration and maximization of returns to shareholders. The kind of relationship 
between firm size and performance has received considerable attention but with conflicting 
results (Symeou, 2012). Some industries, organizations and sectors link large firms to better 
performance in line with the neoclassical theory of firm size while some research findings by 
Oliver and Chukwuani (2014) support a negative relationship between firm size and 
profitability. 
 
An examination of the effect of firm size and profitability by oil and gas firms in Nigeria was 
done by Ebiringa, Yadirichukwu, Ogbu, and Ogochukwu (2013). A sample of twenty quoted 
companies was selected using the simple random sampling technique. The findings among 
others show that an insignificant negative correlation exists between firm size and profitability 
was statistically insignificantly. Oliver and Chukwuani (2014) examine the nexus between firm 
size and financial performance in the Nigerian brewery industry. They found that firm size has 
both short and long term positive effect on EPS, a proxy for financial performance; with a 
significant long run influence. They also find out there is no causality running from either EPS 
to Total Assets or otherwise at both periods. The implication is that firm size does not granger 
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cause EPS and vice versa in Nigeria brewery industry. The proponents of a large board size say 
that if there is a need for external resources (more budget external funding) then the board 
should be large. Additionally, the complicated mechanism of governing the company and 
therefore needing more knowledgeable people should add up to having a larger Board of 
directors (Dalton et al.  1999). Small Boards have their advantages. For instance Jensen (1993) 
is of the view that large boards are ineffective as they can be easily manipulated by the CEO. As 
documented by Lipton and Lorsch (1992), the board members usually don’t express their 
disapproval of the policies made by top management or explicitly criticize them because of their 
performance. 
 
4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK UNDERLYING THE STUDY 
 
It is also pertinent to note that studies have found a significant relationship between cash 
remuneration of executives and the measure of performance (Kerr and Kren, 1992). However, 
this relationship did not show any significance when utilizing “cash plus options as 
compensation measure” (Sarkar, 2013). So from all the foregoing discussions on the pay-
performance relations between executive remuneration and firm’s performance, a proposed 
framework summarizing the major moderators guiding the present study is given below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Theoretical framework of pay-performance nexus 
Source: Adapted from the findings of Olalekan and Bodunde (2015) 
 
5. Methodology 
 
This study employs the ex-post facto, descriptive, correlation, casual/experimental research 
designs. It employs the ex-post facto research design.  The population of the study consists of 
all the companies quoted on the floor of the Nigerian Stock Exchange in the period 2013-
2014.  A total of sixty (60) listed firms excluding non- financial firms in the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange were selected as sample. The sample selection was based on a purposive sampling 
technique; and it is akin to the type adopted by Uwuigbe (2013). Data were extracted from 
annual reports and accounts of the sampled companies for the period 2013-2014 financial 
year. This choice is subject to availability and accessibility of the annual reports. 
Firm Characteristics 
 Firm Size 
 Performance  
Pay Characteristics 
 Liquid cash 
 Non-cash compensation 
Executive 
Compensation 
Firm’s 
performance 
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5.1 Model Specification 
 
The model employed in this study is underpinned to the work of Olalekan and Bodmude 
(2015) where they examined the effect of CEO pay on Bank performance in Nigeria for the 
period 2007 to 2014.  The model is modified and used in this present study. It is specified in a 
stochastic form as follows: 
 
PERFit      =  βo + β1 Exremuit + β2 Fsizeit  + β3Bsizeit + ԑit. 
 
Where 
β 1 – β3 are the coefficients of the parameters  of estimation. 
PERF represents firm performance and is the dependent variable. 
 
Exremuit  represents executive remuneration. 
 
Bsize represents board size 
 
Fsize represent firm size   
 
5.2 Apriori Expectation 
 
The a priori expectation in the model is of the form; β1—β3 >O. What this connotes is that all 
the independent variables are expected to have a negative relationship with banks’ financial 
performance 
 
5.3 Method of Analysis 
 
For the purpose of empirical validation of the variables in the above model, the panel 
estimates generalized least squares (EGLS) is used for analysis. Employing the econometric 
package of E-views version 7.0, the pooled and panel data estimates of the multiple regression 
models shall be obtained after some preliminary statistical analysis such as descriptive 
statistics and correlation matrix as earlier stated. Diagnostic tests shall also be performed after 
the regression analysis which include variance inflation tests (VIFs), Breusch-Godfrey serial 
correlation LM test, Heteroskedasticity test (Harvey test) and Ramsey RESET test. 
 
Table 1. Operationalization of Variables 
Variables Types of Variable Operationalization 
Performance Dependent This is operationalized using profit before 
interest and tax 
Executive 
Remuneration 
Independent This is operationalized using executives 
remuneration. 
Firm Size Independent Using the total assets of the companies. 
Board Size Independent Using the number of total number of directors 
on the corporate board. 
Source: Authors’ findings, 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
Sunday OGBEIDE, Babatunde AKANJI 
234 
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
 
Table 2 Application of diagnostic tests 
  Value Df Probability 
F-statistic  4.768906 (2, 114)  0.0103 
Likelihood ratio  9.641859  2  0.0081 
Variance inflation factor (VIF)   
Date: 01/20/16   Time: 10:32   
Sample: 1 120     
Included observations: 120     
     
  Coefficient Uncentered Centered 
Variable Variance VIF VIF 
C  4.35E+14  8.034817  NA 
EXREMUN  0.103049  1.228330  1.001978 
FSIZE  0.001751  1.171296  1.004745 
BSIZE  6.34E+12  7.739663  1.002765 
Breusch – Godfrey serial correlation LM Test   
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:   
F-statistic 28.4409     Prob. F(2,114) 0 
Obs*R-squared 39.94466     Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0 
    
Heteroscedasticity Test (Harvey  
F-statistic 22.17506     Prob. F(3,116) 0 
Obs*R-squared 43.73655     Prob. Chi-Square(3) 0 
Scaled explained SS 32.68844     Prob. Chi-Square(3) 0 
 
The tables above indicate the results of the Ramsey RESET, variance inflation factor, 
Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation Lm and the Heteroscedasticity (Harvey) tests respectively. 
As usual, the purpose of the Ramsey RESET test is to determine if the model specification 
with which the study is undertaken is approximately made; while the purpose of the 
Heteroscedasticity, Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation and the variance inflation factor is to 
ascertain whether or not the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) model breaks down or not. At any 
point in time, the model breaks down as could be indicated by the assumption tests above; the 
aftermath is loss of the BLUE properties. 
 
The Ramsey RESET test has F-statistic value of 4.768906 with a probability value of 0.0103 
and is statistically significant at 5% level. It implies there is no evidence of misspecification 
of the regression model both in deterministic and econometric form.  The variance inflation 
factor (VIF) helps to reveal the likelihood of the presence of multicollinearity among the 
variables in a construct. According to the rule of thumb, variance inflation factor above  
10 indicates the presence of multicollinearity. Using the uncentered Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) in the above table, none of the explanatory variables has VIF more than 10; suggesting 
there is no multicollinearing in the regression model.  The Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation 
LM test has f – statistic value of 28.44090 and is statistically significant at 1% level. This is 
evidence that no serial correlation exists in the result. Similarly, the Heteroscedasticity 
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(Harvey) test shows f – statistic value of 22.17506 with a probability value of 0.0000 and it is 
statistically significant at 1% level. 
 
Table 3 Summary Statistics 
Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 PERF EXREMUN FSIZE BSIZE 
 Mean  27789483  10902809  71736143  7.583333 
 Median  3469104.  508883.0  12887083  7.000000 
 Maximum  5.68E+08  99786543  9.63E+08  12.00000 
 Minimum -23521789 -2378543.  117992.0  3.000000 
 Std. Dev.  81752207  23035216  1.77E+08  2.937967 
 Skewness  4.701978  2.501237  3.835357  0.451433 
 Kurtosis  26.69366  8.331963  17.12013  2.611329 
 Jarque-Bera  3249.119  267.2729  1291.090  4.831167 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.089315 
     
 Sum  3.33E+09  1.31E+09  8.61E+09  910.0000 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  7.95E+17  6.31E+16  3.73E+18  1027.167 
     
 Observations  120  120  120  120 
Source: E-VIEW 7.0 OUTPUT, 2016 
 
The average performances by way of profit earned before interest and tax in the period 
observed across the sampled companies is N27, 789,483. The standard deviation is 81752207, 
an indication of very high variability from the mean. Even the minimum performance (PBIT) 
is negative. This portrays that when every other item on the income statement are held 
constant, executive remuneration largely consumed the returns made by the sampled 
companies  by in terms of profit earned before interest and tax payment. Obviously, this is 
expected in a study like this given the fact if executive remuneration is arbitrarily determined; 
that is no policy guides its determination or it is over influenced through office politicking. 
This may also be so if the corporate governance code of best practices in Nigeria is not 
tenaciously held to by quoted companies. However this appears worrisome in the light of high 
expectations by shareholders in these days of stiff global challenges. Performance is 
positively skewed and has a positive kurtosis. The Jarque-Bera value of 3249.119 with 
probability value of 0.000000 points out that performance satisfies normality.  
 
The mean executive remuneration across the sampled firms in the period was N10902809. 
The maximum value is N99786543. The standard deviation is 230352.6, the skewness is 
2.501237, and kurtosis is 8.331963. The Jarque-Bera value of 267.2729 at 0.000000 is 
significant; and it portends that the data were normally distributed. Firm size has a mean value 
of N71736 143, with a standard deviation of 1.77. The J-B value of 129`.090 with a 
probability value of 0.000000 indicates significance of the variable and normality of the data 
in terms of distribution. The average board size across the quoted companies used in this 
study is 8 members. The maximum size is 12 members, with a minimum of 3 members. The 
standard deviation is 2.937967, the skewness is 0.451433 and kurtosis is 2.611329. However, 
the J-B value of 4.831167 with probability values of 0.089315 shows the data was not 
normally distributed. 
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Table 3.2 Correlation Matrix 
 PERF EXREMUN FSIZE BSIZE 
PERF 1 0.076 0.165 0.126 
EXREMUN 0.076 1 -0.044 0.001 
FSIZE 0.165 0.044 1 0.052 
BSIZE -0.126 0.001 0.052 1 
Source: E-VIEW 7.0 
 
The summary of the above correlation matrix table shows that all the explanatory variables 
are weak and positively associated. However, the result is quiet impressive from the point of 
view that it is devoid of multicollinearity. 
 
Table 3.3 Granger Causality Test 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     EXREMUN does not Granger Cause 
PERF  118  6.19198 0.0028 
 PERF does not Granger Cause EXREMUN  0.91910 0.4018 
    
     FSIZE does not Granger Cause PERF  118  0.49869 0.6087 
 PERF does not Granger Cause FSIZE  1.18005 0.3110 
    
     BSIZE does not Granger Cause PERF  118  0.15036 0.8606 
 PERF does not Granger Cause BSIZE  0.96500 0.3841 
    
     FSIZE does not Granger Cause 
EXREMUN  118  0.35225 0.7039 
 EXREMUN does not Granger Cause FSIZE  0.39130 0.6771 
    
     BSIZE does not Granger Cause 
EXREMUN  118  0.82585 0.4405 
 EXREMUN does not Granger Cause BSIZE  0.66292 0.5173 
    
     BSIZE does not Granger Cause FSIZE  118  2.51751 0.0852 
 FSIZE does not Granger Cause BSIZE  0.32844 0.7207 
    
    Source: EVIEW 7.0 OUTPUT, 2016 
 
The table above shows that executive remuneration has a causal relationship with 
performance and performance granger causes executive remuneration in a bi-directional 
manner. The ascertainment of this causal relationship is one of the primary interests of this 
study. Firm size does not granger cause performance and performance does not also granger 
cause firm size. Board size does not granger cause performance, and firm size does not 
granger cause executive remuneration and board size does not also granger cause firm size 
whether in a bi -direction way. 
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Application of Hausman test 
 
The purpose of this is to choose either the cross section random effects or the fixed effects in 
the analysis and interpretation of the empirical result. In order words, the Hausman test 
statistic is employed to test for the exogeneity of the unobserved error component. The test is 
necessary because the random effect needs to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables 
otherwise there is endogeneity problem and the random effect estimator is taken as 
inconsistent. The null hypothesis for the Hausman test is: Ho :  βRE = βFE. Where βRE  and 
βFE are coefficient vectors of the time-varying explanatory variables excluding the time 
variables. If the null hypothesis is rejected, we conclude that Random effect (RE) model is 
inconsistent, and the fixed effect (FE) model is preferred. The table below presents the 
Hausman test results for our model. 
 
Table 3.4 Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test 
 
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 455.242682 3 0.0000 
     
      
From the table above, the Hausman test chi-square statistic is 455.24 with a probability value 
of 0.0000 (P>0.05) indicating significant differences. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis and 
conclude that the fixed effect estimator is preferable 
  
Table 3.5 Coefficient Effects 
 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 42801946 29081134 1.471811 0.1466 
EXREMUN -0.742845 0.340244 -2.183271 0.0331 
FSIZE -0.058401 0.172398 -0.338755 0.7360 
BSIZE -359198.1 3600137. -0.099773 0.9209 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.884853     Mean dependent var 27789483 
Adjusted R-squared 0.759606     S.D. dependent var 81752207 
S.E. of regression 40083111     Akaike info criterion 38.15637 
Sum squared resid 9.16E+16     Schwarz criterion 39.61980 
Log likelihood -2226.382     Hannan-Quinn criter. 38.75067 
F-statistic 7.064845     Durbin-Watson stat 1.934426 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     Source: E-VIEWS, 7.0, 2016 OUTPUT 
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The adjusted R-squared explains approximately 76% systematic variation on the performance 
of the sampled quoted companies; leaving 24% unexplained due to the presence of the Error 
term. 
 
The f – statistic value of 7.064845 with a probability of 0.000000 indicates that all the 
explanatory variables are statistically significant at 99% level. The Durbin-Watson statistic 
value of 1.93 which is approximately 2 is an indication of the absence of serial autocorrelation 
in the result. This affords the usefulness of the result for policy perspective. The individual 
coefficients of the explanatory showed that for instance executive remuneration has a negative 
impact (– 0.742845) on the performance of the firms; and is statistically significant at 95% 
level. A unit change in firm size causes 0.058401 unit decrease on the performance of the 
companies and is statistically not significant at 95% level. The coefficient of board size shows 
that it reduces performance of the firms by 359198.1 units and is not statistically significant at 
95% level. 
 
6. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
 
The nexus between executive remuneration and firm performance was robustly examined in 
this study. A relationship exists between firm performance and executive remuneration. 
Specifically remuneration should engender corporate performance. This is because when 
executives are highly remunerated, they are motivated to put their best to positively influence 
the business they operate. In other words, they become more strategic, that is innovative; 
constantly engage in envisioning, and efficient in the use management of the scarce resources 
entrusted to them by the shareholders. This study finding is an affirmation of Kurawa and 
Saidu (2014) investigation where they emphasize that top executives of companies it wrongly 
remunerated may not have the right motivation to perform in the best interest of shareholders. 
This study also ascertained that executive remuneration influences (granger causes) firms’ 
performance; and firm performance in turn influences executive remuneration. From the 
Stance of theory, this is agreed with. Similarly, the finding correlates with that of Conyon and 
Leech (1994). One major aspect that needs to be argued out is the determination of a 
benchmark in terms of percentage increase in executive remuneration for every percentage 
increase in performance of quoted firms; and at what interval the remuneration committee 
should use with a view to motivating the executives. Obviously, this would have to go by way 
of policy formulation. If for any reason the policy must work, it should be succinctly 
enshrined in the Nigerian corporate governance code of best practices. 
 
Executive remuneration was found to negatively influence the performance of firms and is 
statistically significant. This finding is somewhat in consonant with the agency theory. For 
instance, if the agency cost is unduly high, it definitely would have an adverse impact on the 
firms’ performance; given that every other item are held constant. Assuming further that 
every other expense are kept at low ebb occasioned by efficient expenses management and 
agency costs as well as executive pays are high, obviously the return to the shareholders by 
way of earnings before interest and tax may be significantly affected in adversely. The finding 
obtained in this direction is quite in tandem with Olalekan and Bodunde (2015); and Aduda 
(2011). It is however contrary to the finding of Ozken (2007), Kabla (2008); and Fald-Al-
Helzen (2011). 
 
The import of the foregoing assertion and empirical validation clearly underscores the need to 
peg executive remuneration of quoted companies in developing countries like Nigeria at least 
in a flexible manner; certainly, the onus lies squarely on the regulatory agencies like the 
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Firm size was ascertained not to have 
significant positive relationship with firms’ performance; though it has a causality 
relationship with the performance of the firms. In theory, it is expected that as firms perform 
positively, it should increase in size by way of asset acquisition, branches, staff and other 
aspects. The finding correlates with the empirical finding of Ebiringa, Yadirichukwu, Ogbu, 
and Ogochukwu (2013) and is not consistent with the finding of Oliver and Ckukwuani 
(2014). Board size was found to negatively affect the performance of firms and is statistically 
not significant. Theoretically, unduly large corporate board is unhealthy to the performance of 
firms. This is because the efficiency of the board members may be questioned by the 
shareholder. Moreover, it could encourage corporate board room squabbles which more often 
is contrary to the pursuit of shareholders wealth maximization. The finding obtained here 
agrees with that of Dalton et al (1999); Hermalin and Weisbach (1998); Core et al (1999) and 
Jensen (1993). It appears that small board size engenders effectiveness, efficiency and 
competitiveness of firms. They play more oversight function and adequate supervisory role in 
the attainment of set goals/objectives. 
 
7. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This study has examined the nexus between executive remuneration and firm performance in 
Nigeria. The paper contributed empirically to the debate on the association between executive 
remuneration and the performance of quoted companies. The findings as discussed earlier are 
quite robust and revealing for corporate organization executive board members to selflessly 
use for policy perspective and in the promotion of the performance and growth of firms and 
consequently the attainment of the overall objective of shareholders wealth maximization. 
 
Premised on this, the study suggests that executive remuneration of quote firms should be 
pegged constantly in a flexible manner. This will enable shareholders known the causality 
relationship between what is paid to the executive and how that influence performance. There 
is dearth of adequate disclosure of Chief Executive Officers pay, compensation and other 
packages on the annual financial statements. Similarly, remunerations, compensations, 
bonuses and benefits of executive board members are hardly disclosed in the annual reports of 
firms. This makes it difficult for researchers to extract data for analysis. Therefore, regulators 
should make it mandatory for quoted firms to clearly show all the remunerations, bonuses and 
packages in monetary value on the annual reports and accounts. This will then assist 
researchers, users of annual reports and of course members of the general public to find out 
the extent shareholders wealth are being pursuit. 
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